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1The institution of constitutional monarchy remains one of the core institutions in 
the system of parliamentary democracy practised in Malaysia. The hereditary Malay 
rulers in nine states continue to wield considerable inluence on the political system 
through a range of powers conferred by the federal constitution. Few, however, 
may be aware that the Malay rulers fought a pitched battle during the drafting of 
the Malayan independence constitution between 1956 and 1957 to safeguard their 
constitutional status and powers. The primary constitutional documents reveal 
that the rulers challenged strongly the very limited provisions made in the Reid 
draft constitution in regard to their constitutional powers, the role and function of 
the Conference of Rulers, and the limited inancial powers accorded to the state 
governments. The rulers redeined their role and position from that provided in the 
Reid draft constitution and emerged considerably stronger in the administration of 
the state, and on matters of national importance. While the rulers accepted the basic 
premise of their position as “constitutional sovereigns” in the 1957 Malayan federal 
constitution (and state constitutions) as agreed at the London conference in January 
1956, they were able to enhance their constitutional status signiicantly from the 
limited powers provided in the Reid draft constitution.
This intense contestation between the Malay rulers and the ruling Alliance Party 
on the former’s constitutional position during the framing of the Malayan federal 
constitution between 1956 and 1957 has not received adequate attention. Only two 
studies have some historical discussion on the constitutional position of the rulers, 
albeit in a broader sense. The irst, by Simon Smith, discusses the constitutional 
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deliberations involving the rulers as part of a broader examination of the relationship 
between the British government and the Malay rulers since British intervention 
in the Malay states in 1874.2 This work, however, does not examine in suficient 
depth the constitutional contestation in 1956 and 1957 on the role and power of the 
constitutional monarchs because of its much wider focus. Smith, while acknowledging 
that the rulers envisaged a bigger role in the administration of the state than the 
Reid commission or the Alliance, has not developed signiicantly the outcome of this 
element in the new constitution.3 The second work, by Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 
has suggested that the Malay rulers played a “supporting and subservient role” to the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Alliance Party from 1955 
and that the 1957 Malayan constitution “underwrites such a conclusion.”4 Kobkua’s 
work, which has not examined the primary constitutional documents adequately, 
has contended that this period saw the institution of monarchy playing a “distant 
second iddle” against UMNO during the drafting of the constitution.5 This article 
will show that contrary to this argument, the rulers enhanced their constitutional 
role considerably after making strong representations on the role and powers of the 
constitutional monarchs during the later Working Party stages of the constitutional 
deliberations. Fernando’s work on the framing of the Malayan constitution has some 
discussion on the debates between the Alliance Party and the rulers on the latter’s 
constitutional role but does not examine the subject in depth because of its broader 
focus.6 In addition, some legal studies discuss the powers of the rulers under the 
federal constitution from a strictly constitutional law perspective and are largely 
focused on the post-independence period, drawing mainly from a literal reading of 
the constitution and with reference to case studies of court judgements and some 
secondary sources.7 These studies invariably do not shed suficient historical insight 
into the constitution-making process which shaped the powers and status of the 
institution of monarchy in independent Malaya. It is important to understand the 
2. Simon C. Smith, British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralization to Malayan 
Independence, 1930-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 149-160. 
3. Ibid., p. 152.
4. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Palace, Political Party and Power: A story of the socio-political 
development of Malay kingship, Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2011, p. 315.
5 .  Ibid., p. 303.
6. Joseph M. Fernando, The making of the Malayan constitution, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of 
Royal Asiatic Society, 2002, p. 117 and pp. 169-170.
7 . These legalistic studies, mainly on constitutional law, include the work of R.H. Hickling, An 
introduction to the Federal constitution, Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaya Information Services, 
1960, pp. 27-32; Harry E. Groves, The constitution of Malaysia, Singapore: Malaysia Publications, 
1964, pp. 38-59; Mohamed Sufian, H.P. Lee and F.A. Trindade (eds), The constitution of Malaysia: Its 
Development, 1957-1977, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 101-122; F.A. Trindade 
and H.P. Lee (eds), The constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments, Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 76-91; Andrew Harding, The constitution of Malaysia, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012, pp. 113-132; and Abdul Aziz Bari, Malaysian constitution: A critical introduction, 
Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, pp. 51-65.
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debates and agreements reached during the constitutional deliberations to obtain a 
deeper appreciation of the position of constitutional monarchy in the 1957 federal 
constitution. This article irst provides some background to the evolution of the 
monarchy in Malaya and then examines closely several areas where the rulers 
contested strongly the provisions in the Reid draft constitution relating to their 
status and powers. This article shows that the rulers, contrary to claims that they 
played second iddle during the drafting of the constitution, in fact put up much 
resistance to any further erosion of their sovereign powers and were able to redeem 
their constitutional powers considerably following strong arguments presented in the 
Working Party which reviewed the Reid draft constitution.
Evolution of constitutional monarchy in Malaya
British intervention in Malaya in the 19th century reduced considerably the powers 
of the Malay rulers in the nine states with a hereditary ruler after the appointment 
of a British Resident or British Adviser.8 The British control of the mainland Malay 
states began with the Pangkor Treaty signed in 1874 with the ruler of Perak which 
provided for the appointment of a British Resident in the state. Following this, 
similar agreements were signed with the states of Selangor, Negri Sembilan and 
Pahang.9 In these four states, which became the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 
1895 with a central legislature, the rulers were to accept the advice of the British 
Residents on all matters other than the Muslim religion and Malay customs. In the 
Federated Malay States, while the rulers continued to enjoy sovereignty, the British 
Resident was the de facto chief executive in each state.10 The British Advisers in the 
Unfederated Malay States (UMS) comprising Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu 
and Johore, on the other hand, had lesser powers but were still inluential.11 The 
rulers nevertheless retained their sovereignty and all legislation passed by the central 
legislature of the FMS or the state councils of the respective states required their 
approval. During the Japanese occupation of Malaya between 1941 and 1945, the 
rulers were deprived of all their powers and merely had a nominal advisory role in 
the administration of the state.12
On re-occupation of Malaya by the British in 1945, the rulers were reinstated to 
their traditional position as head of state. Their powers, however, were soon to undergo 
radical change with the introduction of political reforms in Malaya by the Colonial 
Ofice. The Malayan Union scheme, introduced in 1946 to create a unitary state with a 
stronger and more eficient administration and defence, transferred the sovereignty of 
8 . Richard Winstedt, A History of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Marican and Sons Ltd., 1968, pp. 224-240.
9 . See Simon Smith, British relations with the Malay rulers, pp. 4-7.
10. Ibid., p. 15.
11. Suwannathat-Pian, Palace, Political Party and Power, pp. 60-86.
12. Paul Kratoska, The Japanese occupation of Malaya: A social and economic history, St Leonards: 
Allen and Unwin, 1998, pp. 67-71.
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the Malay rulers to the British Crown. But following strong protests from the Malays, 
the scheme was discontinued and replaced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement in 
1948.13 Under the new agreement, the rulers regained most of their powers but became 
constitutional monarchs. The 1948 federation agreement converted the Malay rulers 
into constitutional monarchs formally. The agreement, however, did not deine clearly 
the parameters of the powers of the rulers and while it worked considerably well in the 
pre-independent period under the leadership of the High Commissioner, independence 
required a more precise deinition of the status and position of the rulers with the full 
functioning of parliamentary democracy and party politics. The Reid constitutional 
commission invariably had to consider very carefully the constitutional position and 
status of the Malay rulers in a fully-elected civil government.
Deining the parameters of the constitutional monarchy
The Reid commission, which drafted the new constitution of the Federation 
of Malaya between June 1956 and February 1957, was required by their terms of 
reference to ensure “the safeguarding of the position and prestige of Their Highnesses 
as constitutional Rulers of their respective States.”14 The commission was also 
required to provide for a constitutional head of state or Paramount Ruler for the whole 
federation. Invariably, it was tasked to deine the parameters of the constitutional 
monarchy more precisely. While the concept of constitutional monarchy was 
already observed in practice with the coming into force of the Federation of Malaya 
Agreement on 1 February 1948, the legal boundaries of this concept were not clear. 
Moreover, as the British High Commissioner was the chief executive of the federation, 
there seemed no real need to deine more precisely the powers of the constitutional 
monarchs. The High Commissioner was able to moderate the acceptance of federal 
policies and programs in the states by the rulers and their implementation with his 
regular consultations with the Conference of Rulers and the chief ministers of the 
states. The situation, however, would be altered considerably after independence 
with fully-elected legislatures at the state and national levels and this required the 
commission to deine more clearly the parameters of constitutional monarchy.
The challenge facing the commission in determining the constitutional position 
of the rulers is evident in Sir Ivor Jennings’ paper on the changes implied in the 
commission’s terms of reference on the monarchy.15 Jennings in his paper observed 
13. See A.J. Stockwell, British policy and Malay politics during the Malayan Union experiment, Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979, pp. 17–107. See also Albert Lau, The 
Malayan Union controversy, 1942-1948, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 28-240. 
14. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Ofice, Colonial No. 330, p. 6.
15 . The constitutional commission was chaired by Lord Reid, a Lord of Appeal in the Ordinary in 
the House of Lords. The other members of the commission were Sir Ivor Jennings, Master of Trinity 
Hall, Cambridge University; Sir William McKell, a former Governor-General of Australia; Chief 
Justice B. Malik of the Allahabad High Court and Justice Abdul Hamid of the West Pakistan High Court.
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that while the position and prestige of the rulers must be safeguarded vis-a-
vis succession to the thrones, the Civil List, and so forth as provided in the state 
constitutions, they “must be so amended to make Their Highnesses and their heirs and 
successors constitutional rulers.”16 In the then existing arrangement, the executive 
power was vested in “His Highness in Council” and this meant the rulers acting after 
consultation with the state executive council but not necessarily in accordance with 
the advice of such council.17 Jennings felt this was constitutionally inconsistent with 
the practices of having an elected legislature in the states where he felt that power 
should rest with the elected representatives: 
Indeed, the very concept of His Highness in Council, except as a formal body like the Queen in 
Council in the United Kingdom, or the Governor-General in Council in Canada, is inconsistent with 
constitutional government.18 
In relation to the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the supreme head of state, 
Jennings observed that he would not exercise the discretionary powers of the High 
Commissioner but would act on the advice of the government of the federation.19 
The High Commissioner had considerable personal powers under the federation 
government, including the power of veto over legislation passed by the federal 
legislative council. The Reid commission agreed with Jennings on the position of 
the rulers as constitutional monarchs and the need to reafirm this element clearly in 
the new constitution.
The Reid commission felt the rulers should not be involved in politics or be given 
much political functions or powers in keeping with the general understanding of the 
concept of constitutional monarchy based on the British model.20 The commission 
expected the rulers, as constitutional monarchs, to act on the advice of the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet (at the federal level), and the Chief Minister (at the state level), 
with the exception of a few subject matters where the rulers had some discretionary 
constitutional powers. In the draft constitution, the commission provided that the 
supreme head of state, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Article 35), should act on the 
advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.21 The exception to this was in the 
16. Paper by Sir Ivor Jennings titled, “Constitutional changes implicit in the terms of reference.” 
23 Aug. 1956, p. 2, CO 889/2, C.C. 2000/15.
17 . Ibid., p. 3. 
18. Ibid., p. 3.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. See Summary record of 33rd meeting of constitutional commission, 17 Sept. 1956, pp. 1-2, CO 889/1 
(36). See also Summary record of 34th meeting of constitutional commission, 26 Sept. 1956, pp. 1-2, 
CO 889/1 (37).
21. Report of the Federation of Malaya constitutional commission 1957, pp. 12-13. Article 35 states: “In 
the exercise of his functions under this Constitution and the law, the Yang di-Pertuan Besar [later renamed 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong] shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, or 
the appropriate Minister, as the case may be, except in the cases speciied below where he may act in his 
discretion, namely – (a) the appointment of a Prime Minister, (b) the dissolution of Parliament, and (c) the 
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appointment of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of parliament, where the head 
of state could act in his discretion. In other words, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could 
use his discretion to appoint a person who he believed commanded support of the 
majority in parliament as Prime Minister. And, secondly, he could use his discretion 
and refuse to accept the advice of the Prime Minister to dissolve parliament in the 
event the ruling party does not command a majority. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
(Article 34) was, further, entitled to obtain from the federal government information 
relating to the administration of the federation.22 This was also the intention of the 
Alliance which emphasised that the rulers should be above politics as evident in 
their memorandum and oral evidence given to the commission.23 On the role of the 
Conference of Rulers, for example, the Alliance leader and Chief Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, himself a member of a royal household, told the commission when 
asked if the former should have any political function: 
They can discuss matters concerning the Muslim religion and Malay custom, but they cannot 
discuss any matters of administration unless they want to interest themselves in such matters: but 
their decision will not be binding. They will be constitutional rulers.24 
In line with their role as constitutional monarchs, the commission also 
recommended that certain provisions be inserted in the state constitutions (Fifth 
Schedule, Article 1) which provided that in the exercise of his functions under the 
state constitution the ruler will act in accordance with the advice of the Mentri Besar 
(the chief minister) or state executive council.25
The rulers, however, envisaged considerably greater constitutional powers than 
the Alliance government or the Reid Commission had in mind. In the discussions 
with the constitutional commission, the rulers put up considerable resistance to any 
attempt to diminish their powers.26 Their effort, however, was not very successful at 
exercise of his right to obtain information in accordance with the provisions of Article 34.”
22. Report of the Federation of Malaya constitutional commission 1957, p. 13. Article 34 reads: “The 
Yang di-Pertuan Besar shall be entitled to obtain from any other part of the Federal Government such 
information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation as he may call for.”
23 . CO 889/6 (2), Summary record of hearing of the Alliance Party, 27 Sept. 1956, p. 2. See also 
verbatim record of Alliance hearing at CO 889/6 (3), 27 Sept. 1956, pp. 5-6.
24. See also verbatim record of Alliance hearing at CO 889/6 (3), 27 Sept. 1956, p. 6.
25. Report of the Federation of Malaya constitutional commission 1957, p. 71. Article 1 of the Fifth 
Schedule to be inserted into the state constitutions stated: “In the exercise of his functions under this 
Constitution and the law the Ruler shall act in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council or 
of the Mentri Besar, as the case may be, save that in respect of – (a) the appointment of a Mentri Besar; 
(b) the dissolution of the State Legislature, and; (c) the exercise of his right under this Constitution to 
obtain information relating to the administration of the affairs of the State, he may act in his discretion.” 
26 . Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014. Lawson was assisted by M.G. Neal. The other rulers’ representative 
were Tuan Haji Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Aziz, Dato’ Panglima Gantang, the Mentri Besar of Perak; 
Shamsudin bin Nain, Mentri Besar of Negri Sembilan; Mohd. Sufian bin Hashim, State Secretary of 
Pahang ; Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik; Raja Haji Ahmad bin Raja Indut, Mentri Besar of 
Perlis; Dato’ Kamaruddin bin Haji Idris, Mentri Besar of Terengganu; Tuan Haji Mustapha Albakri bin 
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this stage as the draft constitution accommodated very little of the Rulers’ demands 
contained in their memorandum and in the lengthy submissions made by their counsel 
during the hearing given by the commission. Nevertheless, the rulers’ counsel took 
up the issues strongly at the Working Party stage when the Reid draft constitution 
was reviewed by a committee comprising the High Commissioner Sir Donald 
MacGillivray, the federation Attorney-General T.V.A. Brodie and the representatives 
of the Alliance and the rulers. After a hard-fought battle and some tense moments, 
which included a boycott of the Working Party meetings launched by the rulers’ 
representatives at one stage, the rulers were able to add considerably more powers to 
their position then provided in the original Reid draft constitution. They evidently did 
not play second iddle to the Alliance Party during the constitutional deliberations. 
There were four main areas where the rulers put up strong resistance to safeguard 
their prestige, status and powers and were able to restore some of their powers. These 
were irst, in respect of the meaning of the term ‘constitutional monarchy’; second, 
their personal powers in relation to appointments in the state legislatures; third, the 
role and functions of the Conference of Rulers; and, fourth, the inancial powers of 
the state vis-a-vis the federal government.
The rulers’ counsel, Neil Lawson, was the main proponent of a wider constitutional 
role for the nine monarchs during the constitutional debates. He developed 
strong arguments in the Working Party to demand the restoration of some of the 
discretionary powers of the rulers and the Conference of Rulers provided in the 1948 
federation agreement. The main thrust of Lawson’s argument was that the rulers 
had traditionally possessed considerable discretionary powers in appointments to the 
state executive council and ofice of Mentri Besar, on some aspects of administration 
including on inance, and in respect of any territorial changes.27 He felt that these 
discretionary powers should continue to be retained by the nine monarchs. Lawson 
further argued strongly that the Conference of Rulers should have a ‘consultative and 
advisory’ role as provided in the federation agreement.28 This was very much against 
the general position of the Reid commission, as articulated clearly by Jennings (see 
above), which felt that in a fully functioning democracy, the role of the rulers should 
be nominal and the directly elected legislature should be the main authority. The 
Alliance leader Tunku and High Commissioner MacGillivray were in agreement 
with the Reid commission and expressed their reservations in the Working Party 
over the demands made by Lawson.29 There was considerable debate and further 
Haji Hassan, Keeper of the Rulers’ Seal; Tengku Mohamed Hamzah bin Tengku Zainal Abidin, Mentri 
Besar of Kelantan; Abdul Aziz bin Haji Abdul Majid, Mentri Besar of Selangor; and Azmi bin Haji 
Mohamed, representative of the Mentri Besar of Kedah. 
27. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
p. 7, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014.
28. Fernando, The making of the Malayan constitution, p. 117.
29. Minutes of irst Working Party meeting, 22 Feb 1957, CO 941/85. See also Fernando, op. cit., 
pp. 169-170. 
Joseph M. Fernando 156
Archipel 88, Paris, 2014
compromises were necessary before an agreement was reached. We now examine 
these areas of debate.
Deining the constitutional monarchy
The constitutional documents indicate that the rulers’ understanding of the term 
“constitutional monarchy” in relation to their position and powers in the respective 
states was much broader than that of the constitutional commission or the Alliance. 
In their memorandum to the Reid commission, the rulers’ stated unequivocally that 
while they accepted the decisions made at the London conference in January 1956 
to establish a self-governing independent state with a strong central government, 
they wanted to ensure that their prestige and status as constitutional monarchs were 
safeguarded in the new constitution without further erosion of their powers.30 The 
rulers’ memorandum stated: 
Their Highnesses while accepting the status of Constitutional Sovereigns and the necessity of such 
limitations being imposed upon the present manifestations of Their sovereignty as are necessary to 
give effect to the agreed decisions of the London conference, consider that it would be inconsistent 
with the safeguarding of Their prestige and position to accept other or further limitations.31 
Two issues which the rulers regarded as the most important manifestations of 
their sovereignty was their personal position as titular founts of the temporal and 
spiritual authority in their respective territories, and the ties of personal allegiance 
between the rulers and their subjects in the states.32 The rulers’ counsel argued that 
the existing position on the sovereignty of the rulers was that they could promulgate 
a new constitution for their respective states unhindered by any provision in their 
existing constitutions or the federal agreement.33 And it was up to the rulers to decide 
the date when they would assume a “truly constitutional position,” as envisaged with 
the changes made in the new constitution.34 This was a reminder to the commission 
that while the rulers accepted their position as constitutional monarch in the new 
constitution, the eventual form would have to be decided in negotiations with the 
Alliance government and Her Majesty’s Government.35 On their ties with their 
subjects, the rulers emphasised that there was a special bond of loyalty and that this 
was strongly evident in the fact that 8,000 people applied to be registered as subjects 
30. Rulers’ memorandum to the Reid commission, 12 September 1956, pp. 4-5, CO 889/6 (22). 
31. Ibid., p. 5.
32. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
p. 7, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014. See also Rulers’ memorandum to the Reid commission, 12 September 
1956, p. 4, CO 889/6 (22).
33. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
p. 7, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014.
34. Ibid., p. 7.
35. Ibid., p. 8.
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of the rulers as against only 150 who applied for federal citizenship in 1955.36 “They 
suggest that there is a very strong feeling of loyalty to the Ruler of the State in which 
you live and work,” said Lawson.37
There was an interesting debate during the hearing given by the Reid commission 
to the representatives of the rulers on the interpretation of the position and powers of 
the constitutional sovereign. The rulers’ counsel argued that a constitutional sovereign 
meant a ruler who exercised his sovereignty in accordance with the provisions of a 
constitution which had force of law within his territory.38 That is, the sovereign would 
rule in accordance with the machinery of the state, a popularly elected state legislature 
that would decide on laws to be passed and inancial control.39 The rulers accepted the 
role of constitutional sovereign in the temporal sphere but would not concede anything 
in the spiritual sphere.40 This point was not lost on the constitutional commission. 
This is evident from the fact that the Reid commission did not insert a provision to 
make Islam the oficial religion of the federation, as requested by the Alliance Party, 
on the grounds that the rulers had indicated clearly in their submissions that such a 
provision would go against their position as head of the Muslim faith in their own 
states.41 Matters related to the Muslim faith had always been under the jurisdiction 
of the Malay rulers.42 Further, in relation to the sovereignty, the rulers wanted the 
Council of State, headed by the ruler, to continue to have inancial control at least in 
the interim period before the state legislatures were fully elected and not the elected 
State Executive Council. Counsel for the rulers pointed out to the commission that in 
some states control of inances was constitutionally vested in the Council of State and 
not the State Executive Council.43 The rulers’ counsel pointed out, for example, that 
under Clause 24 of Part II of the Perak constitution the Council of State was vested 
with the inancial powers.44 The rulers clearly had a considerably different conception 
of constitutional monarchy in the states than the commission and made a strong effort 
to retain its main elements. The commission, however, was not fully persuaded by 
the rulers’ arguments and largely provided for the conventional understanding of 
constitutional monarchy based on the British model in the draft constitution. The 
Reid draft constitution thus provided for the dissolution of the Council of State on 1 
January 1959 when elections in that year would pave the way for fully-elected state 
36. Ibid., p. 7. The number of people who applied for naturalization as subjects of the rulers was 33,500 
in 1955 while those who applied for naturalization as federal citizens was only 550.
37. Ibid., p. 7.
38. Ibid., p. 7.
39. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
40. Ibid., p. 8.
41. Report of the Federation of Malaya constitutional commission 1957, p. 73.
42. Simon Smith, British relations with the Malay rulers, pp. 15-16.
43. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
p. 9, See CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014.
44. Ibid., p. 9.
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legislatures.45 The rulers, as we will see below, objected to the recommendations of 
the Reid commission and sought a wider role. 
The Rulers and the selection of appointees in the state administration
An area where the rulers sought a bigger role for the constitutional sovereign was 
in the appointments to the state legislature and administration. The rulers wanted 
discretionary powers to appoint the Mentri Besar, members of the state executive 
council and representation for special interests.46 The rulers felt they should be 
able to select the Mentri Besar and appoint members to the state executive council, 
including from outside the state legislature. While the rulers accepted that the 
machinery of government, including inance, would be run by representatives in the 
legislature elected by the people, they sought a bigger role for the state executive 
council which could include nominated oficials, possibly even a nominated Mentri 
Besar. The commission, however, thought the appointment of nominated oficials 
would go against the notion of responsible elected government where power lay in 
the hands of elected representatives. They felt that the Mentri Besar should be an 
elected one responsible to the electorate.47 The rulers’ counsel Lawson attempted 
to make a case for the right of the rulers’ to select members of the state executive 
council from outside the elected members in the state legislatures. He did not think 
this would be unconstitutional and argued that oficials of the executive council 
could sometimes have their ears closer to the ground than the elected representatives 
and be better placed to advice the monarch.48
Lawson developed an argument to suggest that it was a common convention in 
“constitutional monarchies” for the Mentri Besar to be chosen by the head of state.49 
The commission, however, was clearly not in favour of the Mentri Besar being 
selected by the ruler, and possibly from outside the elected members in the state 
legislature. They thought this was not practicable in a parliamentary democracy. 
Justice Abdul Hamid, a member of the commission, cited a hypothetical case where 
a Mentri Besar was appointed by the ruler but who then did not enjoy the conidence 
of the legislative assembly.50 Would such appointment be cancelled and would 
that provide for responsible government, he asked.51 Lawson attempted to justify 
45. Report of the Federation of Malaya constitutional commission 1957, p. 77.
46. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
pp. 9-12, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014.
47. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
p. 10, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014. See also Summary record of 31st meeting of constitutional commission, 
12 Sept. 1956, p. 2, CO 889/1 (34), C.C. 1000.
48. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
p. 11, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014.
49. Ibid., p. 12.
50. Ibid., p. 12.
51. Ibid., p. 12.
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his argument by drawing a parallel with the constitutional monarch in Britain. He 
argued that the Queen could theoretically appoint him (Lawson) as Prime Minister 
if she wanted to: “Whether I should enjoy the conidence of the House of Commons 
is another question.”52 The rulers’ counsel thought that the Mentri Besar would be 
a member of the state executive council but not necessarily an elected member of 
the state legislature. The new constitution, he argued, could provide for such an 
approach which would enable the ruler to select someone from the state executive 
council who may not be an elected member of the state legislature.53
The constitutional commission was not impressed with Lawson’s argument. Reid 
thought that Lawson was suggesting a model which was a mix between the American 
and British system of government: 
The American method is that Congress has security of tenure, and cannot by itself be in control of 
inance, etc. The executive arm are none of them members of Congress and they get along in their 
own way. I do not suppose you are suggesting that that picture should be adopted in Malaya?54 
Lawson contended that the rulers felt that in the short term there was room for 
nominated members to lead the state executive council.55 Despite the strong argument 
raised by the rulers’ counsel, in the draft constitution the Reid commission provided 
that the ruler of a state should appoint a Mentri Besar who was a member of the state 
legislature and who was likely to command the conidence of the majority in the 
legislature.56 This was in keeping with the general principles of the appointment of 
elected chief administrators in parliamentary democracies.
The functions of the Conference of Rulers
One of the areas where the rulers put up considerable resistance was the provisions 
related to the status and functions of the Conference of Rulers. The Reid commission 
did not make speciic provisions in the draft constitution on the Conference of 
Rulers other than providing for the body to elect the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under 
Article 27.57 The Rulers recommended that the new Yang di-Pertuan Agong for the 
federation should be elected based on seniority in terms of the rulers’ assent to their 
ofice.58 The commission agreed largely with the rulers’ and their submission was 
adopted in the draft constitution. The status of the Conference of Rulers, however, 
52. Ibid., p. 13.
53. Ibid., p. 12.
54. Ibid., p. 13.
55. Ibid., p. 14.
56. See Fifth Schedule of Reid Report, Part I, Article 2, p. 71. The Fifth Schedule includes articles 
which should be inserted in the state constitutions.  See Summary record of the 33rd meeting of the 
constitutional meeting, 17 Sept. 1956, pp. 1-3, CO 889/1 (36).  
57. Report of the Federation of Malaya constitutional commission 1957, p. 11.
58. Verbatim report of Hearing of counsel on behalf Their Highnesses the Rulers, 14-15 Sept. 1956, 
pp. 26-28, CO 889/1 (32), C.C. 2014. See also Rulers Memorandum, pp. 8-10, CO 889/8.
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became a major issue of debate in the meeting of the Working Party. The Conference 
of Rulers had been formally convened since 1948 and met several times a year to 
discuss issues of national importance and was briefed by the High Commissioner. 
Prior to that, an informal meeting of the rulers in the Federated Malay States called 
the “Durbar” had met infrequently before the war to discuss issues of common 
importance to the four federated states.
The commission felt the Conference of Rulers could not play any constitutional 
part in the new constitution and merely provided for the body to elect the supreme 
head of state, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.59 The Alliance had also told the 
commission that the rulers should be above politics. At the second meeting of the 
Working Party on 25 February 1957, the Rulers’ representatives pointed out that 
there was no provision in the draft constitution for the establishment and constitution 
of the Conference of Rulers. They felt this could give rise to dificulties even in the 
limited functions conferred on the Conference of Rulers in Article 27 of the draft 
constitution.60 The rulers’ wanted a number of additional powers to be conferred on 
the Conference of Rulers apart from the appointment of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
and his deputy.61 They felt the agreement of the Conference of Rulers should be 
sought in the appointment of the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court, 
and heads of important commissions such as members of the Election Commission, 
Public Services Commission and Police Service Commission.62 It was argued, for 
example, that as the Election Commission in the discharge of its duties would be 
encroaching into the respective states and impinging on their territorial sovereignty, 
it was only right that they should have the right to concur in the appointment of 
such bodies.63 In addition, the rulers submitted that their consent should be sought 
in changes to the constitution on several matters which affected their sovereignty. 
These were, territorial changes affecting the states, changes which could affect 
the Muslim religion and Malay customs, amendments to the entrenched clauses 
(Article 157 on Malay special rights and Article 82 on Malay land reservations) 
in the constitution, changes affecting the status or powers of the states, and those 
affecting the privileges, position and dignities of the rulers.64 The rulers felt that 
changes related to these matters impinged on their sovereignty and they should have 
59 . Summary record of 33rd meeting of constitutional commission, 17 Sept. 1956, p. 3, CO 889/1 (36). 
Summary record of the 34th meeting of the constitutional commission, 26 Sept. 1956, p. 2, CO 889/1 (37).
60. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85.
61. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85.
62. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85.
63 . Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85.
64. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, pp. 1-2, CO 941/85.
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the right “to give or withhold concurrence in such changes.”65
Further, the rulers wanted the Conference of Rulers to be consulted on changes 
to law affecting immigration, the concurrent list, power of parliament to legislate 
for states for uniformity (Article 70 of draft constitution), and the formula used to 
distribute federal funds to the states.66 The rulers were also unhappy that the draft 
constitution did not provide for the involvement of the rulers in the ceremony of 
afirmation of ofice of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The draft constitution merely 
provided for the newly-elected Yang di-Pertuan Agong to be sworn into ofice 
by taking an oath before the Chief Justice. The rulers’ submitted that the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong, the Supreme Head of State, should make an ‘afirmation’ of ofice 
and allegiance, and not an oath, and that this should be done in the presence of the 
Conference of Rulers and not merely before the Chief Justice.67 This was eventually 
provided in the new constitution.
An interesting discussion ensued in the meeting of the Working Party following 
the new demands made by the rulers’ representatives. There was resistance from 
the Alliance and the High Commissioner MacGillivray to what was viewed as 
encroachment into politics by the rulers and which was deemed to conlict with their 
status as constitutional monarchs. MacGillivray thought that to give these additional 
functions to the rulers would bring them into the arena of politics and contradict one 
of the main recommendations of the Reid commission that the rulers should become 
constitutional rulers.68 The Alliance leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, argued that to 
give these additional powers to the Conference of Rulers could be regarded as an 
encroachment on the powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.69 MacGillivray pointed 
out that the existing functions of the Conference of Rulers were clearly understood 
and they met from time to time with the High Commissioner as representative 
of Her Majesty’s Government to discuss matters of major importance. However, 
after independence this situation would have changed considerably as the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong would be the representative of the rulers and there would be no 
High Commissioner and conferring these powers would impinge on the powers of 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, he argued.70 
The rulers’ representatives made some concessions in relation to the demands 
above but in the main held irm on their request for the concurrence of the Conference 
65. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 2, CO 941/85.
66. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 2, CO 941/85.
67. Minutes of the second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, CO 941/85. See Note of Points 
to be raised by the Rulers Representatives, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 2, CO 941/85.
68. Minutes of the second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85. 
69. Ibid, p. 1.
70. Ibid, pp. 1-2.
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of Rulers in policy changes of national importance.71 After further discussions, the 
meeting agreed that the Conference of Rulers should be consulted on any changes 
affecting, “the privileges, position and dignities of Their Highnesses.”72 It was also 
agreed that every Yang di-Pertuan Agong, before entering upon his ofice, would 
take an oath of ofice and allegiance before the Conference of Rulers and the Chief 
Justice as set out in the First Schedule.73 This was signiicantly different from the 
recommendations of the Reid commission (Article 31) which recommended that the 
oath of ofice be taken before a Chief Justice.74
Eventually, the Alliance agreed to the other demands of the Rulers to be consulted 
on changes which affected their prestige and status, the territorial boundaries of the 
states and matters of major importance. Changes made to Part IV of the Reid draft 
constitution provided for the Conference of Rulers (Article 38 of the new constitution) 
to be oficially constituted and consulted in the appointment of members of important 
commissions such as the Election Commission and the Police Service Commission; 
appointment of judges to the Supreme Court; and have the exclusive power in their 
respective states to grant pardons, reprieves, suspend or commute sentences passed 
by any court in respect of criminal offences.75 This was a major victory for the Rulers 
as these provisions provided for a clearer role of the Conference of Rulers than that 
which had been recommended by the Reid Commission. It also provided stronger 
safeguards in the constitution to protect the status, position and privileges of the rulers.
Federal–state relations and the question of inancial autonomy
The provisions relating to federal-state inancial relations proved to be a major 
battleground between the rulers and the Alliance government. The rulers’ fought 
hard to safeguard revenues traditionally distributed to the states under the 1948 
federation agreement and sought greater constitutional guarantees to receive annual 
capitation and development grants, as of right, to provide for greater inancial 
stability. The Alliance had to make several concessions to placate the demands of 
the rulers. The inancial relations between the federal government and the states 
had evolved over time through trial and error and while it had worked fairly well 
there were considerable weaknesses and the commission sought to improve the 
existing inancial arrangements and procedures. In the main, the commission sought 
to provide for a strong central government inancially, in line with the terms of 
reference, by reserving most of the taxing powers to the federal government. At 
71. Ibid, p. 2.
72. Ibid.,p. 2.
73. Minutes of the Second meeting of the Working Party, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 3, CO 941/85. See also 
Minutes of the Sixth meeting of the Working Party, 4 March 1957, p. 5, 941/85.
74. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, p. 12 and p. 62.
75. Minutes of the Sixth meeting of the Working Party, 4 March. 1957, pp. 5-6, CO 941/85. See Minutes 
of Eighth meeting of Working Party, 8 March 1957, pp. 4-6, CO 941/85. See also CO 941/87, Minutes 
of the Working Party.
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the same time, through an intricate set of grants guaranteed to the states annually 
from the federal government, the commission tried to provide for a greater degree 
of inancial autonomy. The states, however, were not happy with the scheme of 
distribution of inancial grants from the federal government and the sharing of levies 
from the export of tin and fought strongly to strengthen the states’ inancial position 
when the Working Party reviewed the recommendations of the Reid commission. 
Under the then existing inancial arrangements, the states depended on federal grants 
to meet most of their annual expenses. In 1956, for example, the federal grants to the 
states amounted to $193 million of the total $292 million expenditure by the states.76 
The federation paid most of the state expenditure on education, health services and 
the capital cost of drainage and irrigation. Under the system there was continued 
haggling each year between the federal government and the states to cover the 
latter’s expenses and need for development funds. The commission recognised that 
the existing inancial system while it was an improvement to the system in existence 
before 1954 could pose dificulties after independence when political parties would 
determine the inances.77
One major change that the commission made to ease the states’ inancial situation 
was to make education, medical and health services federal subjects.78 This meant 
that the states would not be burdened by these large expenses. Taxation, on the other 
hand, was a very contentious issue in the federal system and varied considerably 
in the Commonwealth and other federal systems. The majority in the commission 
did not want to extend the powers of the states to levy taxes which they felt would 
hamper the conduct of business on a national scale.79 The Reid commission provided 
for three main sources of grants to the states under Article 103.80 These were grants-
in-aid of general revenue; the assignment of certain amounts from federal taxation, 
and licence fees and other fees of a local character. A simple formula was provided 
for the calculation of the grants-in-aid which drew on the provisions of the federation 
agreement. The commission recommended (Article 102) the establishment of a 
National Finance Council, comprising the Prime Minister, one other Minister and 
the Chief Ministers of the states to discuss matters of inance, including the state 
expenditures, capitation and other federal grants.81 But the recommendations of the 
commission did not rest well with the rulers and the states.
In the Working Party, the rulers’ representative raised four issues in relation to 
federal-state inancial relations: the taxing powers of the states; state revenues; state 
rights to grants; and the disposal of surpluses. Under the existing inancial system the 
76. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, p. 57.
77. Jennings’ paper titled “Present inancial arrangements,” 29, Aug. 1956, p. 6, CO 889/2, C.C. 2000/3.
78. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, p. 60.
79. Ibid, p. 60.
80. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
81. Ibid., pp. 61-64.
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state surpluses reverted back to the federal government.82 The rulers’ representatives 
noted that while the constitutional commission had intended that the states should 
have limited taxing powers, this was not relected in the draft constitution.83 They 
also submitted that there should be an assignment to the states, as a matter of right, 
of revenues from the sources mentioned in the Third Schedule of the federation 
agreement.84 These included revenues from lands, mines and forests, revenues from 
licences, entertainment duty, fees in courts, fees and receipt from services provides 
by state governments, revenues from municipal and town boards, rents from state 
property and a share in surplus from the Malayan Currency Fund.85
The Alliance representatives in the Working Party did not accept these proposals 
as they felt the federation government should be free to make any adjustment 
necessary after consultation with the National Finance Council.86 The Alliance 
argued that revenues of the state should be authorised by Act of Parliament and that 
it would be dificult to lay down in the constitution that the states should receive 
any speciic items of revenue.87 The rulers’ representatives, however, pointed out 
that under the provisions of Article 156 of the draft constitution, the states would 
in fact continue to receive revenue during the transitional period from sources cited 
in the Third Schedule of the federation agreement, indicating that it would not be a 
great departure from the existing practice.88 Eventually, after further discussion, the 
Alliance agreed that the states should receive as of right, grants-in-aid, which was in 
line with the suggestion by the Reid commission.89 The Alliance, however, rejected 
the Rulers’ proposal that a ixed percentage of the national revenue from customs 
import duties and excise should be allocated to the states as of right.90 A serious 
crisis ensued as a result of the Alliance’s reluctance to meet some of the proposals on 
inancial provisions made by the rulers’ representatives.91 The rulers’ representatives 
boycotted the seventeenth meeting of the Working Party on 9 April 1957 as a result.92 
82. Minutes of Eleventh meeting of the Working Party, 12 March 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85.
83. Ibid., p. 1.
84. Eleventh meeting of the Working Party, 12 March 1957, pp. 1-2, CO 941/85. Part III of the federation 
agreement provides for 30 percent of customs duty on petrol to be divided by the states;  a capitation 
grant for each adult who has attained the age of 20;  a grant to cover all expenditure on education, 
medical and health services, and capital expenditure on drainage and irrigation works; a development 
grant determined by the High Commissioner for the states of Kelantan, Pahang, Perlis and Terengganu; 
and a transitional grant to ensure there was a surplus over expenditure, not exceeding $500,000. See 
Memorandum on inancial relations between federal government and states, 10 Oct. 1956, CO 889/7 (6). 
85. Third Schedule, Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948.
86. Eleventh meeting of the Working Party, 12 March 1957, p. 2, CO 941/85.
87. Ibid., p. 2.
88. Ibid., p. 2.
89. Ibid., p. 2.
90. Ibid., p. 4.
91. Minutes of the Working Party of the Constitution of the Federation 1957, CO 941/86 (E/14).
92. Sixteenth meeting of the Working Party, 2 April 1957, pp. 1-4, CO 941/85. See also Note of discussion 
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The Alliance was taken aback by the boycott. High Commissioner MacGillivray, 
too, was alarmed by the actions of the rulers’ representatives and quickly sought 
to ind a compromise between the parties.93 He suggested that as a compromise it 
should be proposed to the rulers’ representatives that the provisions of Part III of the 
Fifth Schedule of the Federation Agreement, which provided the state with additional 
allocations for certain contingencies after approval from the High Commissioner, be 
included in the new constitution.94 The Alliance agreed and this offer was conveyed 
to the rulers’ representatives immediately by the High Commissioner. The rulers’ 
representatives, as a result of the compromise offered by the Alliance, returned to the 
discussions in the following Working Party meeting.95 This was a signiicant victory 
by the rulers to strengthen the inancial autonomy of the states.
Further discussions ensued on other areas of the inancial provisions and more 
compromises were needed. The rulers’ representatives reiterated their proposal that 
25 percent of national revenue from customs duties and excise should be given 
to the states in order to provide greater inancial autonomy. They pointed out that 
Johore, for example, received less from the percentage of petrol duty because of its 
proximity to duty-free Singapore.96 In addition, the states were not keen to continue 
with the present system whereby development grants were only paid to certain states 
on an ad-hoc basis as they felt this resulted in arguments each year.97 The rulers’ 
representatives offered a new proposal to resolve the impasse. They suggested that 
there should be a “block allocation” to the states annually based on a sum of dollars 
per head of population of the state; and a sum per mile of the state roads.98 The 
Alliance representatives, however, felt the federation government could not delegate 
to the state governments its responsibility to ensure that the states received a fair 
share of the allocations under the federal system.99 They argued that under the new 
proposals there was a danger that the undeveloped states such as Kelantan, Pahang, 
Perlis and Terengganu would no longer receive the development grant.100 
The rulers’ representatives then suggested that a “Reserve Fund” could be 
in Conference of Rulers, 10 April 1957, CO 491/86.
93. Minutes of Seventeenth meeting of the Working Party, 9 April 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85.
94. Seventeenth meeting of the Working Party, 9 April 1957, p. 1, CO 941/85. The provisions of 
Part III (paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8) of the Fifth Schedule of the Federation Agreement allowed the states 
additional funds, after consultation with the Financial Secretary and the High Commissioner, to cover 
special circumstances, to provide for additional appointments in the state civil service, to make use of 
savings on expenditure as supplementary expenditure, and to receive special allocations for expenditure 
for “unforeseen circumstances.” See Fifth Schedule of Federation Agreement.
95. Minutes of Eighteenth meeting of the Working Party, 16 April 1957, p. 1.
96. CO 941/85, Minutes of Eighteenth meeting of the Working Party, 16 April 1957, p. 4, CO 941/85.
97. Ibid., p. 4.
98. Ibid., p. 4.
99. Ibid., p. 5.
100. Ibid., p. 4.
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created to assist states facing inancial dificulties.101 If the proposals were accepted 
in principle, they noted, it would not be too dificult to work out a formula for the 
allocation of funds to the states based on a percentage basis.102 If this was agreed the 
states would give up the percentage of petrol import duty, the development grant, the 
transitional grant and the currency surplus (on which they were earlier adamant).103 
The states were also willing to forego their proposal that they should be entitled 
to raise new taxes if they were given the grants as of right contained in their new 
proposals.104 MacGillivray felt that the new proposals of the rulers’ representatives 
were “too rigidˮ and expected some states to suffer.105 He suggested instead that a 
percentage of the capitation grant could be paid into a reserve fund which could 
be used to assist the undeveloped states as well as be used for development in 
general.106 After further discussion, it was agreed that there should be a capitation 
grant formulated along the lines proposed by the rulers’ representatives.107 The 
meeting also agreed that there should be a grant to meet the cost of maintenance of 
state roads and that a portion of the annual capitation grant should be set aside in a 
reserve fund for the states.108 This brought to a close the very dificult and complex 
discussions on the inance relations between the Alliance government and the states. 
The rulers fought hard to ensure that the states received adequate and guaranteed 
allocations annually to meet their expenses in order to ensure a greater degree of 
inancial autonomy. The efforts of the rulers clearly achieved this goal.
Conclusion
The discussion above shows clearly that the rulers fought back strongly 
during the constitutional deliberations to defend their position and privileges as 
constitutional monarchs and the rights of the states to greater inancial autonomy. 
They were clearly not playing second iddle in the constitutional negotiations. While 
accepting their roles as constitutional monarchs under the new federal constitution, 
the rulers redeined the parameters of the institution of constitutional monarchy than 
originally provided in the Reid draft constitution. The Conference of Rulers, as a 
result of the rulers’ submissions, gained greater prestige and powers than provided 
under the draft constitution. Under these changes the Rulers would be consulted on 
101. Ibid., p. 5.
102. Ibid., p. 5.
103. Ibid., p. 5.
104. Ibid., p. 6.
105. Minutes of Twentieth of the Working Party, 18 April 1957, p. 2, CO 941/87.
106. Ibid., p. 2.
107. Minutes of Twentieth of the Working Party, 18 April 1957, p. 2, CO 941/87. Minutes of the Twenty-
second meeting of the Working Party, 27 April 1957, pp. 2-3, CO 941/87. The rate of the capitation was 
eventually agreed at the Twenty-second meeting of the Working Party on 27 April 1957.
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constitutional changes to the position and privileges of the rulers, territorial borders 
and matters relating to the Muslim religion and Malay customs. Equally signiicant, 
the rulers were able to secure greater inancial guarantees to the states in terms of 
annual federal grants in the constitution. The states as a result of the efforts of the 
rulers’ representatives were able to secure, as of right, annually the capitation grant 
and road maintenance grant. In addition, the federal constitution provided for the 
states to receive a portion of the export duties on minerals such as tin and enabled 
them to retain any surpluses remaining from the annual budgets. The institution of 
constitutional monarch in Malaya thus emerged from the constitutional deliberations 
considerably stronger and more inluential than that envisaged by the Alliance and 
the Reid commission.
Primary records
The primary constitutional records of the Reid constitutional commission (1956-
1957) are contained in the Colonial Ofice (CO) series CO 889/1-6. The minutes of the 
meetings of the Working Party which reviewed the Reid Commission draft constitution 
are contained in CO 941/85, CO 941/86 and CO 941/87. Both these constitutional 
records are deposited at The National Archives of Britain (TNA) in Kew, London.

